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Abstract 
This editorial introduces a WIREs Climate Change Special Collection of nine Opinion Articles, each 
answering the question, ‘Is it too late (to stop dangerous climate change)?’  Given the rising sense 
of urgency--and for some despair—to arrest climate change, these invited authors were asked to 
develop their own answer to this question, or indeed to challenge it’s framing.  What might ‘too 
late’ mean?  Too late for what exactly, or for whom?  What effect might the language of ‘too late’ 
have on the public imagination, on political discourse and on academic research?  This collection of 
essays reveals a diversity of ways of thinking about the relationship between climate and humanity, 
different modes of analysis and different prognoses for the future, ranging from qualified 
pessimism through pragmatic realism to qualified hope. 
 
Introduction 
Something happened to the climate of public discourse about climate during the year 2018/19.  A 
new sense of urgency began to be promulgated by new political actors and social movements, at 
least in Europe and North America.  The idea of ‘time running out’ gained increasing salience, of 
there being only ‘12 more years remaining to save the future’, of feeling that ‘panic’ was a needed 
and appropriate response to the unfolding changes occurring to the world’s climate.  
This new discursive climate was shaped through numerous interventions, but perhaps most 
symbolically powerfully were two new voices who appeared on the public stage.  One of these was 
the American politician and activist Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez who, as a House Representative for a 
New York congressional district, become a disruptive voice from the left of American politics.  Early 
in 2019 she began to champion a reformulated Green New Deal as the best way for a future United 
States to tackle climate change.  This was a necessary and urgent response, she argued, to the 
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existential dangers posed by climate change, “Millennials and people, you know, Gen Z and all 
these folks that will come after us are looking up and we’re like: The world is going to end in 12 
years if we don’t address climate change and your biggest issue is how are we gonna pay for it?"i  A 
very different voice was that of Greta Thunberg, a Swedish teenage schoolgirl.  Having started her 
lone school strike in August 2018, Thunberg rapidly became the voice of a new generation of young 
people around the world.  Not afraid of using blunt imagery, Thunberg claims that climate change is 
‘an existential crisis’, that ‘the house is on fire’, that ‘panic is an appropriate response’ and that 
climate change is ‘an emergency’.  Starting during the late autumn of 2018, climate emergencies 
have indeed been declared within numerous jurisdictions operating at different scales, including by 
the UK Parliament in May 2019.  
But there is also no shortage of more established voices, or voices of hardened 
environmental journalists, making similar claims.  For example in September 2018, the UN 
secretary-general, António Guterres, made the bald claim, “We face a direct existential threat” 
from climate change.  “If we do not change course by 2020, we risk missing the point where we can 
avoid runaway climate change, with disastrous consequences for people and all the natural systems 
that sustain us.”ii  The veteran American commentator Tom Englehardt has placed humanity on a 
suicide watch for itself.  “Even for an old man like me”, he says, “it’s a terrifying thing to watch 
humanity make a decision, however inchoate, to essentially commit suicide.”iii  And the 
octogenarian UK academic Meyer Hillmann has claimed that it is too late to stop climate change.  
“We’re doomed”, he says, “because climate change will decimate life on earth”.iv  A few years 
earlier, in his book Reason in a Dark Time, environmental philosopher Dale Jamieson had already 
explained why we have failed to stop climate change (Jamieson, 2014). 
It would seem therefore that, at least for some, it is already too late. 
Two scientific publications published during 2018 seem to have been significant in shaping 
the narrative for some of these commentators.  In August 2018 the Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences published a paper titled, ‘Trajectories of the Earth System in the 
Anthropocene’, which became the fourth most-mentioned published article of 2018 across all of 
sciencev.  The authors speculated about the risk of what they termed a future “hothouse Earth”.  
“Where such a threshold [to trigger such an outcome] might be is uncertain, but it could be only 
decades ahead at a temperature rise of ∼2.0°C above pre-industrial and thus it could be within the 
range of the Paris Accord [sic] temperature targets” (Steffen et al., 2018: 8257).  And then, a few 
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months after this, the IPCC published their Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C (IPCC, 2018), 
an assessment that had been requested in December 2015 by the Parties to the UNFCCC.  This IPCC 
Report would appear to have been the origin of the slogan ‘we have only 12 years left’.  The IPCC 
claims that “global warming is likely to reach 1.5°C between 2030 and 2052 if it continues to 
increase at the current rate” (IPCC, 2018: 6); so if 1.5°C is the threshold of climate danger then  
reaching it, according to the IPCC, in fact lies between 12 and 34 years away.  The IPCC Report also 
estimated that “In model pathways with no or limited overshoot of 1.5°C, global net anthropogenic 
CO2 emissions decline by about 45% from 2010 levels by 2030 … reaching net zero around 2050 …” 
(IPCC, 2018: 14); so maybe this reference to 2030 is the origin of the ‘12 years’ claim.   
There is a long history of climate deadlines being set publicly by commentators, politicians 
and campaigners … and then of those deadlines passing with the threat unrealised.  For example, 
back in October 2006 the UK Prime Minister Tony Blair declared that “… we have a window of only 
10-15 years to take the steps we need to avoid crossing catastrophic tipping points.”  And Andrew 
Simms of the New Economics Foundation think-tank set his climate clock ticking on 1 August 2008, 
claiming that there were only 100 months left to prevent global climatic disaster.  In his own words, 
Simms shouted ‘fire’ in claiming that by 1 December 2016 “we could reach a tipping point for the 
beginnings of runaway climate change”vi, pre-empting Thunberg’s ‘house on fire’ by more than a 
decade.  This metaphor of the countdown clock has been re-invigorated over the past 2 or 3 years 
with new on-line climate clocks being established at the Mercator Institute in Berlinvii and at the 
Human Impact Lab in Montrealviii, counting down by the second to ‘the end’ (Asayama et al., 2019). 
There is an equally long history of portraying the climatic future in fearful and apocalyptic 
terms (Killingworth & Palmer, 1996; Buell, 2003; Boia, 2005).  This trope did not start with Wallace-
Wells’ recent book, ‘The Uninhabitable Earth: a Story of the Future’ (Wallace-Wells, 2019)--although 
he certainly aligned himself with the new climate zeitgeist expressed by Ocasio-Cortez and 
Thunberg.  In the years following 9/11 climate change was frequently compared with the threats of 
weapons of mass destruction and global terrorism and claimed to be much greater (Hulme, 2008), 
while Risbey (2008) suggested that the language of urgency, crisis and catastrophe was indeed 
appropriate to use for climate change.  But what seems different now is the seeming precision of 
the new deadline and the wider fears and anxieties about the future which this language has 
unleashed.  As with a student paralysed by writer’s block as the deadline for submitting her 
dissertation approaches, panic sets in.   
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The implications of this new climate of deadline-ism are important to reflect on (Asayama et 
al., 2019).  First, the rhetoric of deadlines and ‘it’s too late’ does not do justice to what we know 
scientifically about climate change.  Climate prediction science is based on probabilistic forecasts 
which underpin the quantification of risk.  There is a range of possible values for future global 
warming.  It is as false scientifically to say that the climate future will be catastrophic as it is to say 
with certainty that it will be merely lukewarm.  Neither is there a cliff edge to fall over in 2030 or at 
1.5°C of warming, as indeed the IPCC’s 2018 Report makes clear.  There are many ways to set a 
policy deadline, but you can’t do it by science alone.   
Second, the rhetoric of climate endings and extinction does not help psychologically – which 
is the main point made by O’Neill and Nicholson-Cole (2009) in their widely cited article titled ‘Fear 
won’t do it’.  It all too easily induces feelings of terror, as Ed Maibach at George Mason University 
exemplifies, “As a public health professional (and as a human), I find the prospect of 3 or 4 degree C 
of global warming to be nothing short of terrifying.”ix  But inducing a state of terror generates 
counter-productive responses in human behaviour (Wolf & Tubi, 2019) and also creates political 
space for the unthinkable.  Just as invoking a state of terror after 9/11 paralysed people’s critical 
thinking and made many Americans and others accept the reckless decision by Bush administration 
to invade Iraq, a state of terror can do the same thing for climate change.  For example, some 
scientists are now advocating to use dangerous technologies such as solar climate engineering to 
seek to stop global warming.  As Lizzie Burns, a director’s of one of these project teams based at 
Harvard University has said: “Our idea [solar climate engineering] is terrifying… but so is climate 
change.”x 
Nor does the rhetoric of climate deadlines and extinction help politically.  Simply ‘uniting 
behind the science’ or ‘passing on the words of science’ gets us no further forward.  Even if climate 
science predicted the extinction of humanity, climate change “raises a host of ethical, historical and 
cultural questions that are at most tangentially connected to any scientific findings” (Evensen, 
2019: 429).  Answering these questions is the hard business of politics that simply and repeatedly 
asserting an artificial deadlines cannot short-circuit.  And, finally, the rhetoric of extinction and ‘it’s 
too late’ does not help morally.  Again, even if we took these claims literally, the mere fact of 
human extinction by no means impels us to conclude that the correct moral response must be to 
prevent that extinction.  There may well be other moral demands upon us which take precedence, 
and yet which we ignore (Gottlieb, 2019).   Why the human species above other species?  Why are 
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future generations more morally demanding of us than the dispossessed victims of today?  Why is 
suicide the worst sin of all? 
Despite what some activists like Thunberg claim, climate change is not a black and white 
issue.  It has many shades of grey.  By this I mean that while the fact that humans are altering the 
world’s climate is absolutely clear, the significance of this fact is not self-evident.  As many have 
realised for a long time now, climate change is a ‘wicked problem’ (Hulme, 2009).  To believe that 
there is an absolute truth to be told about what climate change means, or what ‘it demands’ of 
each of us, is misguided.  What climate change means to each person is not revealed truth 
emerging from some scientific script.  The political meanings and individual and collective 
responses to climate change have to be worked out iteratively and in association with those who 
think differently to us, sometimes radically so.  They have to be negotiated within the political 
structures and processes we inhabit, negotiations that can’t be circumvented by an appeal to the 
authority of science being ‘on our side’.  (Although of course this ‘working out’ must also include 
the possibility of renegotiating some of those same political structures). 
 
The Special Collection 
Against this background and context, in the autumn of 2018 WIREs Climate Change 
commissioned a series of Opinion Articles from carefully selected authors from different regions of 
the world and from different disciplines to explore a range of answers to this question: ‘Is it too late 
(to stop dangerous climate change)?’  The sub-title--‘to stop dangerous climate change’—is used 
deliberately to reflect the framing of the politics of climate change which was put in play back in 
1992.  Article 2 of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change stated that the ‘ultimate 
objective’ of the Convention was “to achieve stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference [emphasis added] 
with the climate system”  From the mid-1990s onwards, 2°C of global warming above an imagined 
pre-industrial climate emerged as a negotiated target threshold to aim for, but the specification of 
‘dangerous climate change’ took a new turn following the 2015 Paris Agreement.  The Paris 
Agreement offered the aspirational target of 1.5°C as appropriate to aim for, an aspiration which 
the IPCC’s subsequent Special Report seems to have reified as the new absolute definition of 
climate danger in the minds of many. 
6 
 
Including co-authors, a total of 14 scholars, seven female and seven male, from nine 
different countries were enrolled to write nine essays for the journal.  This collection of voices is 
intended to address the question from various geographical, gendered and disciplinary 
perspectives--for example from the disciplines of eco-criticism, politics and international relations, 
post-colonial studies, ethics, integrated assessment, energy economics and behavioural psychology.  
The commissioned authors were given free rein to interpret the question how they wished and to 
develop their answers accordingly – or indeed to challenge the framing of the question.  What 
might ‘too late’ mean?  Too late for what exactly, or for whom?  What effect might the language of 
‘too late’ have on the public imagination, on political discourse and on academic research?  Why 
has this sense of time running out appeared at this particular moment?   
The nine essays appearing in this Special Issue of WIREs Climate Change, volume 11(1), 
2020, are as follows: 
 Bain,P. (UK) & Bongiorno,R. (UK)  It's not too late to do the right thing: moral motivations for 
climate change action  
 Dubash,D. (India) Revisiting climate ambition: the case for prioritising current action over 
future intent  
 Farbotko,C. (Australia) Is it too late to prevent systemic danger to the world's poor?  
 Garrard,G. (Canada) Never too soon, always too late: reflections on climate temporality 
 Hayward,B. (NZ), Salili,D. (Fiji), Tupuana'I,L. (NZ) & Tualamali'I,J. (NZ) It’s not 'too late'.  
Learning from Pacific Small Island Developing States in a warming world  
 Jewell,J. and Cherp,A. (Sweden) On the political feasibility of climate stabilisation pathways: 
is it too late to keep warming below 1.5C? 
 La Rovere,E. (Brazil) The potential contribution of emerging economies to stop dangerous 
climate change: the case of Brazil  
 Moser,S. (USA) The work after 'it's too late' (to prevent dangerous climate change) 





So is it too late? 
The nine contributions to this Collection speak for themselves, but let me here draw together a few 
threads from across these essays and offer a few interpretative perspectives of my own.  I identify 
four broad approaches to how these commissioned authors answer the question. 
The first position is the pragmatic realism and guarded optimism expressed in the essays 
written by Jewell, Dubash and La Rovere.  Jewell and Cherp (2020) and Dubash (2020) agree about 
the importance of getting the politics of climate change right if climate change is to be arrested 
anytime soon.  Jewell and Cherp are concerned that economic and technical feasibility assessments 
of deep emissions cuts have squeezed out the harder work of evaluating their political feasibility.  
These authors want to offer some hope that change will happen fast enough, but in the end are 
pessimistic that the necessary political alignments are achievable.  As if to illustrate Jewell’s 
argument, La Rovere (2020) offers an optimistic view about what can be achieved technically and 
economically, emphasising the possibilities of low emissions development strategies (LEDS) in his 
illustrative case of Brazil.  “It may not be too late to stop dangerous climate change”, he concludes.  
And yet his conclusion comes with a huge caveat: “If these LEDS are made politically acceptable, 
then …” (La Rovere, 2020: xxx; emphasis added).  Given the new politics of Brazil under Bolsonaro 
this ‘if’ would seem to rather avoid the question of political feasibility, the very point Jewell and 
Cherp are making.  La Rovere might equally well have concluded, ‘It may be too late unless these 
LEDS are made politically acceptable’, turning his hopeful optimism into political realism.  
Dubash’s position is somewhere in between these two.  He recognises that too often 
desirability (i.e., good intentions) has been mistaken for (political) feasibility.  For this reason he 
argues for a more pragmatic approach to the politics of delivering countries’ Nationally Determined 
Contributions (NDCs).  To escape mere rhetorical gaming—the eternal danger in international 
political negotiations--Dubash wants an emphasis on learning-by-doing.  Countries should move 
forward, step-by-step, prioritising experimentation about which policies are economically, 
technically, socially and politically feasible (cf. Lawrence & Schäfer, 2019).  He advocates for 
monitoring trends in actual policy outcomes, rather than merely calculating whether the pledged 
numbers stack up--as think tanks such as Climate Analytics repeatedly offer.  This resonates closely 
with the argument recently put forward by Fuller and Font (2019: 322) with respect to the related 
problem of air pollution: “Switching the [evaluative] emphasis to trends and rates of change, rather 
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than compliance, would provide a transparent connection between policy measures and 
outcomes”. 
A second line of reasoning from some authors is to foreground the cultural resources 
available to different groups of people which can be deployed to resist the drivers and impacts of 
climate change.  Hayward et al. (2020) write from a Pacific islands cultural perspective and draw 
attention to the traditional community values of vai nui or fonofale (i.e., interconnected well-living).  
In similar vein, Whyte’s (2020) argument from an indigenous people’s perspective in North America 
is to recognise the powerful notion of kinship and the qualities of trust, accountability and 
reciprocity that have long characterised such cultures.  Both these authors seek to resist the simple 
idea of ‘it’s too late’, but whereas Hayward et al. offer an optimistic account of how such cultural 
values can defuse some of the dangers of climate change, Whyte’s analysis is darker.  The historical 
damage already wrought on indigenous people in his continent, he argues, cannot easily be undone 
– certainly not unless environmental justice is placed at the forefront of all plans to tackle climate 
change.  Again, just hitting the carbon or Celsius numbers is far from an adequate solution to the 
loss and damage caused by climate change. 
A third approach to answering the question can be recognised in the arguments put forward 
by Bain and Bongiorno (2020) and Moser (2020).  These two essays come at the question from a 
psychological angle and both develop positions that seek to offer hope.  Bain and Bongiorno are 
quite explicit about this and suggest that diverse groups of people around the world are in fact 
quite prepared to embrace (radical) changes to their behaviours and social arrangements, changes 
that might be seen as necessary to undermine the drivers of climate change.  For them, even now, 
“climate change can help bring about a more moral and caring society” (p.xxx).  Moser on the other 
hand is a little more cautious.  She too is seeking out sources of hope amidst apparent despair and 
finds it by focusing on the psychological and imaginative space that can open up for people after 
they have confronted what she calls both “the endings and possibilities” [emphasis added] of 
climate change.  Whilst at one level this seems contradictory—it is simultaneously too late, but yet 
not too late, to stop dangerous climate change--Moser explores how hopeful action in the world 
can be sustained in the indeterminate time that now lies before us (cf. Stoknes, 2015).  Although 
writing from a literary rather than a psychological perspective, Garrard’s (2020) conclusion is not 
dissimilar.  He resists the easy option of reducing our imaginative response to climate change to the 
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binary choice of either salvation or catastrophe.  Yes, it is too late (to stop climate change), but it is 
not too late to “learn how to dwell in this predicament” (p.xxx).   
 Finally, a fourth approach to answering the question can be discerned among these authors.  
This is latent in several of the nine essays, but is most explicit in Farbotko (2020) and Whyte (2020) 
and to some degree also in Garrard (2020).  This is to radically redefine the parameters of what 
climate change signifies, to refuse to be limited by the global numbers of carbon budgets or 
degrees Celsius that drive the discourse of ‘12 more years’ and ‘it’s too late’.  For Farbotko, far 
more important than asking ‘Is it too late?’ is to ask the ethically charged question ‘For whom might 
it be too late?—a question echoed by Garrard.  She argues that the climate solutions being pursued 
(to avoid dangerous climate change) may simply heighten other dangers for those who are already 
left out of the global systems and networks of wealth creation, livelihood security and human 
rights.  This she calls out as “the systemic embedding of social exclusion” (p.xxx) and is as big a 
danger to human welfare and global justice as climate change itself, if not bigger. 
Whyte also seeks to escape the narrow formulation of solving climate change as a question 
of getting the numbers right.  For him the answer to climate change lies in re-opening the past, in 
considering a much larger set of interlinked dynamics of imperial history, economics, politics, 
justice and human development.  In calling for equal attention to be given to ‘relational tipping 
points’ as to ecological ones, Whyte agrees with Farbotko in warning that mere climate solutionism, 
without attending adequately to environmental justice, may simply perpetuate future precarity for 
billions of people.  Garrard also refuses to engage the question on its own terms, but his resistance 
is for a different reason.  His reading of the question is rooted an understanding of the human 
condition as one comprising frailty, unknowability and ambitious, yet limited, moral and material 
agency.  From his humanities perspective, shouldering climate change “more fully and profoundly 
than the politico-scientific framing of the IPCC allows” (p.xxx) means learning to live better with the 
predicament we have created rather than trying to solve it.   
For these latter three authors in particular there are no numerical deadlines which can or 
should constrain or determine the necessary human reflection on climate change or that should 
shape our political action in the world.  It is already well too late for many (Whyte), or may shortly 
be too late for many more (Farbotko), or else lateness itself is an unhelpful notion as we come to 
terms with the full implications of our humanity (Garrard)--which includes the material 





In an essay published in 2018, literature PhD student Casey Williams at Duke University reflected on 
why eco-fiction so often gets climate change wrong.  “It’s tempting to read worsening disasters as 
portents of the apocalypse to come”, he wrote, “a preface to some final lethal bang.  But this isn’t 
usually how environmental change, and especially not climate change, works.  Climate change 
doesn’t describe a single future catastrophe, but a slow and uneven unraveling, a drawn-out 
apocalypse that began long ago and that will stretch to an end that probably won’t feel like much of 
an ending at all.  For most people, climate change is ordinary danger amplified, enduring injustice 
heightened.”xi  Williams’ perspective provides a useful antidote to the trope of ‘too-lateness’.  As 
several of the authors in this Special Collection observe, it is never too late to do the right thing.  
There is always tomorrow.  Even though Whyte (2020) reminds us that we cannot undo the past—
in fact because of this fact--it is essential for humans to continue to seek out the sources of hope, 
creativity, respect and solidarity that characterise the human reflex at its best.   
 This difference of perspective—between imagining at time after which it is too late or 
refusing to concede to such a framing--is a result of different temporal calendars and epistemic 
claims being applied to the question of climate change.  On the one hand is the calculative logic of 
reductive science that fuels the dystopias of climate emergencies, a hothouse Earth and the 
unravelling of human civilization.  The latter discourse has great power over the human 
imagination.  But it is dangerous to reduce the possibilities of the future to being defined by climate 
alone (Hulme, 2011), especially when the opportunities for shaping that future are truncated by an 
unyielding artificial deadline.  Since the desired outcome—climatic salvation--is beyond our limited 
human abilities to engineer this way of thinking holds only the promise of failure.  The deadlines 
which underpin the fears of it being ‘too late’ lean upon the moral power of absolutes, a dangerous 
even idolatrous force when left untempered by the political and human virtues of pragmatism and 
humility (Stenmark, 2015).  Building a movement on such arbitrary deadlines narrows the horizon 
of political action and judges ‘success’ on a frighteningly limited set of criteria.        
On the other hand is the open-ended and irrepressible unfolding of human history which 
encounters no innate boundaries, sub-divisions or endings.  History does not end, the future is not 
pre-ordained and it is never too late to do the right thing.  Responding appropriately to the harsh 
realities of climate change is not really a question of whether or not particular numerical targets 
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(whether of carbon emissions or global temperature) are hit by 2030, 2040 or 2050.  These 
enumerations of the future, at best, are only standing in for deeper motivational instincts that 
instead should guide human action in the world: justice, dignity, kinship, hope.  At worst, they 
emasculate the ethical and political deliberation and energy that is needed to create the future in 
all its variegated dimensions.  A focus on the numbers alone merely “creates incentives for gaming 
pledges”, as Dubash (2020: xxx) puts it.  For all of the authors in this WIREs Special Collection, how 
one gets there matters more, and for some authors much more, than merely getting there.  Means 
do matter more than ends.  Or putting this differently, there are some futures beyond 1.5°C (or 
even 2°C) that are more desirable than other futures which do not exceed these warming 




As Editor-in-Chief of WIREs Climate Change I would like to thank the nine WIREs Domain Editors 
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